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Abstract
Modal logics of strategic ability usually focus on capturing what it means for an
agent to have a feasible strategy that brings about some property. While there is a
general agreement on abilities in scenarios where agents have perfect information,
the right semantics for ability under incomplete information is still debated upon.
Epistemic Temporal Strategic Logic, an offspring of this debate, can be treated as
a logic that captures properties of agents’ rational play.
In this paper, we provide a semantics of ETSL that is more compact and compre-
hensible than the one presented in the original paper by van Otterloo and Jonker.
Second, we use ETSL to show that a rational player knows that he will succeed
if, and only if, he knows how to play to succeed – while the same is not true for
rational coalitions of players.
Keywords: multi-agent systems, theories of agency, game-theoretical founda-
tions, modal logic.
1 Introduction
Modal logics of strategic ability usually focus on capturing what it means for an agent
to have a feasible strategy that brings about some property. While there is a general
agreement on abilities in scenarios where agents have perfect information, the right
semantics for ability under incomplete information is still debated upon. Epistemic
Temporal Strategic Logic, proposed by van Otterloo and Jonker [19], is an offspring of
this debate, but one that leads in an orthogonal direction to the mainstream solutions.
1
Reasoning about Abilities of Agents
The central operator of ETSL can be read as: “if A play rationally to achieve ϕ (mean-
ing: they never play a dominated strategy), they will achieve ϕ”. Thus, one may treat
ETSL as a logic that captures properties of agents’ rational play in a sense.
This paper contains two main messages. First, we provide a semantics of ETSL that is
more compact and comprehensible than the one presented in [19]. ETSL is underpinned
by several exciting concepts. Unfortunately, its semantics is also quite hard to read
due to a couple non-standard solutions and a plethora of auxiliary functions, which is
probably why the logic never received the attention it deserves. Second, and perhaps
more importantly, we use ETSL to show that a rational player knows that he will succeed
if, and only if, he knows how to play to succeed – while the same is not true for rational
coalitions of players.
2 Reasoning about Abilities of Agents
Modal logics of strategic ability [1, 2, 14] form one of the fields where logic and game
theory can successfully meet. The logics have clear possible worlds semantics, are
axiomatizable, and have some interesting computational properties. Moreover, they are
underpinned by intuitively appealing conceptual machinery for modeling and reasoning
about systems that involve multiple autonomous agentsas the basic concepts originate
from temporal logic (i.e., the logic of time and computation), and classical game theory,
which emerged in an attempt to give precise meaning to common-sense notions like
choices, strategies, or rationality – and to provide formal models of interaction between
autonomous entities, that could be used in further study.
2.1 ATL: Ability in Perfect Information Games
Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) [1, 2] was invented to capture properties of
open computer systems (such as computer networks), where different components can
act autonomously, and computations in such systems are effected by their combined
actions. Alternatively, ATL can be seen as a logic for systems involving multiple agents,
that allows one to reason about what agents can achieve in game-like scenarios. Since
ATL does not include incomplete information in its scope, it can be seen as a logic for
reasoning about agents who always have perfect information about the current state of
affairs.
The language of ATL generalizes the branching time temporal logic CTL [3], in the
sense that path quantifiers are replaced with so called cooperation modalities. Formula
〈〈A〉〉ϕ, where A is a coalition of agents, expresses that A have a collective strategy
to enforce ϕ. ATL formulae include temporal operators: “ g” (“in the next state”), 
(“always from now on”) and U (“until”). Operator♦ (“now or sometime in the future”)
can be defined as ♦ϕ ≡ ⊤U ϕ. Like in CTL, every occurrence of a temporal operator is
preceded by exactly one cooperation modality 〈〈A〉〉.1 Formally, the recursive definition
1 The logic to which such a syntactic restriction applies is sometimes called “vanilla” ATL (resp. “vanilla”
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of ATL formulae is:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉 gϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ϕ
Example ATL properties are: 〈〈jamesbond〉〉♦win (James Bond has an infallible plan
to eventually win) and 〈〈jamesbond, bondsgirl〉〉funU shot-at (Bond and his girlfriend
have a collective way of having fun until someone shoots at them).
A number of semantics have been defined for ATL, most of them equivalent [4]. In
this paper, we use a variant of concurrent game structures,
M = 〈Agt, St,Π, pi, Act, d, o〉,
which includes a nonempty finite set of all agents Agt = {1, ..., k}, a nonempty set
of states St, a set of atomic propositions Π, a valuation of propositions pi : Π →
P(St), and a nonempty set of (atomic) actions Act. Function d : Agt× St→ P(Act)
defines actions available to an agent in a state, and o is a deterministic transition function
that assigns an outcome state q′ = o(q, α1, . . . , αk) to state q, and a tuple of actions
〈α1, . . . , αk〉 that can be executed by Agt in q. A strategy of agent a is a conditional
plan that specifies what a is going to do for every possible situation (sa : St → Act
such that sa(q) ∈ d(a, q)).2 A collective strategy (called also a strategy profile) SA for
a group of agents A is a tuple of strategies Sa, one per agent a ∈ A. A path Λ in M is
an infinite sequence of states that can be effected by subsequent transitions, and refers
to a possible course of action (or a possible computation) that may occur in the system;
by Λ[i], we denote the ith position on path Λ. Function out(q, SA) returns the set of all
paths that may result from agents A executing strategy SA from state q onward:
out(q, SA) = {λ = q0q1q2... | q0 = q and for every i = 1, 2, ... there exists a tuple
of actions 〈αi−11 , ..., α
i−1
k 〉 such that αi−1a = Sa(qi−1) for each a ∈ A, αi−1a ∈
d(a, qi−1) for each a /∈ A, and o(qi−1, αi−11 , ..., αi−1k ) = qi}.
Now, the semantics of ATL formulae can be given via the following clauses:
CTL etc.).
2 This is a deviation from the original semantics of ATL, where strategies assign agents’ choices to se-
quences of states, which suggests that agents can recall the whole history of each game. Both types of
strategies yield equivalent semantics for “vanilla” ATL [16]. However, they do not result in equivalent log-
ics for ATL* nor for most ATL variants with incomplete information. We use “memoryless” strategies here
because they pose less conceptual difficulties when defining the semantics. Moreover, model checking strate-
gic abilities of agents with perfect recall and incomplete information is believed undecidable [2, 16], which
undermines practical importance of these logics.
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M, q |= p iff q ∈ pi(p) (where p ∈ Π);
M, q |= ¬ϕ iff M, q 6|= ϕ;
M, q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, q |= ϕ and M, q |= ψ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 gϕ iff there is a collective strategy SA such that, for every Λ ∈
out(q, SA), we have M,Λ[1] |= ϕ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ iff there exists SA such that, for every Λ ∈ out(q, SA), we have
M,Λ[i] for every i ≥ 0;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ iff there is SA st. for every Λ ∈ out(q, SA) there is i ≥ 0, for
which M,Λ[i] |= ψ, and M,Λ[j] |= ϕ for every 0 ≤ j < i.
The complexity of ATL model checking is linear in the number of transitions in the
model and the length of the formula [2], which suggests that practical applications may
be possible.
2.2 Strategic Ability and Incomplete Information
ATL is unrealistic in a sense: real-life agents seldom possess complete information
about the current state of the world. Alternating-time Temporal Epistemic Logic (ATEL) [17,
18] enriches the picture with an epistemic component, adding to ATL operators for rep-
resenting agents’ knowledge: Kaϕ reads as “agent a knows that ϕ”. Additional oper-
ators EAϕ, CAϕ, and DAϕ refer to mutual knowledge (“everybody knows”), common
knowledge, and distributed knowledge among the agents from A. Models for ATEL
extend concurrent game structures with epistemic accessibility relations ∼1, ...,∼k⊆
Q×Q (one per agent) for modeling agents’ uncertainty; the relations are assumed to be
equivalences. We will call such models concurrent epistemic game structures (CEGS)
in the rest of the paper. Agent a’s epistemic relation is meant to encode a’s inability to
distinguish between the (global) system states: q ∼a q′ means that, while the system is
in state q, agent a cannot determine whether it is not in q′. Then:
M, q |= Kaϕ iff ϕ holds for every q′ such that q ∼a q′.
Relations ∼EA, ∼CA and ∼DA , used to model group epistemics, are derived from the
individual relations of agents from A. First, ∼EA is the union of relations ∼a, a ∈ A.
Next, ∼CA is defined as the transitive closure of ∼EA. Finally, ∼DA is the intersection of
all the ∼a, a ∈ A. The semantics of group knowledge can be defined as below (for
K = C,E,D):
M, q |= KAϕ iff ϕ holds for every q′ such that q ∼KA q′.
Example 1 (Gambling Robots) Two robots (a and b) play a simple card game.
The deck consists of Ace, King and Queen (A,K,Q); it is assumed that A beats K , K
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q0
qw ql
win
qAK qAQ qKQ qKA qQA qQKa a ab b
b
keep,nop keep,nop
keep,nop
keep,nopkeep,nop
keep,chg keep,chg
keep,chg
keep,chg
exch,nop exch,nop
exch,nop
exch,nop
exch,nop
exch,chg exch,chg
exch,chg
keep,chg
exch,nop
exch,chg
exch,chg
keep,nop
keep,chg
exch,chg
Figure 1: Gambling Robots game. Arrows represent possible transitions of the sys-
tem (labeled with tuples of agents’ actions); dashed lines connect states that are indis-
cernible for particular agents.
beats Q, but Q beats A. First, the “environment” agent env deals a random card to
both robots (face down), so that each player can see his own hand, but he does not know
the card of the other player. Then robot a can exchange his card for the one remaining
in the deck (action exch), or he can keep the current one (keep). At the same time,
robot b can change the priorities of the cards, so that A becomes better than Q (action
chg) or he can do nothing (nop). If a has a better card than b after that, then a win is
scored, otherwise the game ends in a “losing” state. A CEGS for the game is shown in
Figure 1; we will refer to the model as M0 throughout the rest of the paper. Note that
M0, q0 |= 〈〈a〉〉♦win (and even M0, q0 |= Ka〈〈a〉〉♦win), although, intuitively, a has no
feasible way of ensuring a win. This is a fundamental problem with ATEL, which we
discuss briefly below.
It was pointed out in several places that the meaning of ATEL formulae is somewhat
counterintuitive [6, 7, 11]. Most importantly, one would expect that an agent’s abil-
ity to achieve property ϕ should imply that the agent has enough control and knowl-
edge to identify and execute a strategy that enforces ϕ (cf. also [16]). This problem is
closely related to the well known distinction between knowledge de re and knowledge
de dicto [15, 12, 13].
A number of frameworks were proposed to overcome this problem [6, 7, 16, 11,
19, 5], yet none of them seems the ultimate definitive solution. Most of the solutions
agree that only uniform strategies (i.e., strategies that specify the same choices in in-
distinguishable states) are really executable. However, in order to identify a successful
strategy, the agents must consider not only the courses of action, starting from the cur-
rent state of the system, but also from states that are indistinguishable from the current
one. There are many cases here, especially when group epistemics is concerned: the
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agents may have common, ordinary or distributed knowledge about a strategy being
successful, or they may be hinted the right strategy by a distinguished member (the
“boss”), a subgroup (“headquarters committee”) or even another group of agents (“con-
sulting company”). Most existing solutions [16, 19, 5] treat only some of the cases
(albeit rather in an elegant way), while others [7, 11] offer a more general treatment of
the problem at the expense of an overblown logical language (which is by no means
elegant).
Recently, a new, non-standard semantics for ability under incomplete information
has been proposed in [9, 10], which we believe to be both intuitive, general and elegant.
We summarize the proposal in the next section, as we will use it further to capture
strategic abilities of agents.
2.3 An Intuitive Semantics for Ability and Knowledge
When analyzing consequences of their strategies, agents must consider also the out-
come paths starting from states other than the current state – namely, all states that
look the same as the current state. Thus, a property of a strategy being successful with
respect to goal ϕ is not local to the current state; the same strategy must be success-
ful in all “opening” states being considered. In [9, 10], a non-standard semantics for
the logic of strategic ability and incomplete information has been proposed, which we
believe to be finally satisfying. In the semantics, formulae are interpreted over sets of
states rather than single states. This reflects the intuition that the “constructive” ability
to enforce ϕ means that the agents in question have a single strategy that brings about
ϕ for all possible initial situations – and not that a successful strategy exists for each
initial situation (because those could be different strategies for different situations).
Moreover, we introduce “constructive knowledge” operators Ka, one for each agent
a, that yield the set of states, indistinguishable from the current state from a’s perspec-
tive. Constructive common, mutual, and distributed knowledge is formalized via oper-
ators CA,EA, and DA. The language, which we tentatively call Constructive Strategic
Logic (CSL) here, is defined as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ∼ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉 gϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ϕ | CAϕ | EAϕ | DAϕ |
CAϕ | EAϕ | DAϕ.
Individual knowledge operators can be derived as: Kaϕ ≡ E{a}ϕ and Kaϕ ≡ E{a}ϕ.
Moreover, we define ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ≡ ¬(¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2), and ϕ1 → ϕ2 ≡ ¬ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2.
The models are concurrent epistemic game structures again, and we consider only
memoryless uniform strategies. Let img(q,R) be the image of state q with respect to
relation R, i.e. the set of all states q′ such that qRq′. Moreover, we use out(Q,SA) as
a shorthand for ∪q∈Qout(q, SA), and img(Q,R) as a shorthand for ∪q∈Qimg(q,R).
The notion of a formula ϕ being satisfied by a set of states Q ⊆ St in a model M is
given through the following clauses.
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M,Q |= p iff q ∈ pi(p) for every q ∈ Q;
M,Q |= ¬ϕ iff M,Q 6|= ϕ;
M,Q |=∼ϕ iff M, q 6|= ϕ for every q ∈ Q;
M,Q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M,Q |= ϕ and M,Q |= ψ;
M,Q |= 〈〈A〉〉 gϕ iff there exists SA such that, for every Λ ∈ out(Q,SA), we have
that M, {Λ[1]} |= ϕ;
M,Q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ iff there exists SA such that, for every Λ ∈ out(Q,SA) and
i ≥ 0, we have M, {Λ[i]} |= ϕ;
M,Q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ iff there exists SA such that, for every Λ ∈ out(Q,SA), there is
i ≥ 0 for which M, {Λ[i]} |= ψ and M, {Λ[j]} |= ϕ for every
0 ≤ j < i;
M,Q |= KAϕ iff M, q |= ϕ for every q ∈ img(Q,∼KA) (where K = C,E,D);
M,Q |= KˆAϕ iff M, img(Q,∼KA) |= ϕ (where Kˆ = C,E,D and K =
C,E,D, respectively).
We will also write M, q |= ϕ as a shorthand for M, {q} |= ϕ, and this is the notion
of satisfaction (in single states) that we are ultimately interested in – but that notion is
defined in terms of the satisfaction in sets of states.
Now, Ka〈〈a〉〉ϕ expresses the fact that a has a single strategy that enforces ϕ from
all states indiscernible from the current state, instead of stating that ϕ can be achieved
from every such state separately (what Ka〈〈a〉〉ϕ says, which is very much in the spirit
of standard epistemic logic). More generally, the first kind of formulae refer to having
a strategy “de re” (i.e. having a successful strategy and knowing the strategy), while
the latter refer to having a strategy “de dicto” (i.e. only knowing that some successful
strategy is available; cf. [7]). Note also that the property of having a winning strategy
in the current state (but not necessarily even knowing about it) is simply expressed
with 〈〈a〉〉ϕ. Capturing different ability levels of coalitions is analogous, with various
“epistemic modes” of collective recognizing the right strategy.
Example 2 Robot a has no winning strategy in the starting state of the game: M0, q0 |=
¬〈〈a〉〉♦win, which implies that it has neither a strategy “de re” nor “de dicto” (M0, q0 |=
¬Ka〈〈a〉〉♦win∧¬Ka〈〈a〉〉♦win). On the other hand, he has a successful strategy in qAK
(just play keep) and he knows he has one (because another action, exch, is bound to
win in qAQ); still, the knowledge is not constructive, since a does not know which strat-
egy is the right one in the current situation: M0, qAK |= 〈〈a〉〉 gwin ∧Ka〈〈a〉〉 gwin ∧
¬Ka〈〈a〉〉 gwin. Also, b’s playing chg enforces a transition to qw for both qAQ, qKQ, so
M0, qAQ |= Kb〈〈b〉〉 gwin (robot b has a strategy “de re” to enforce a win from qAQ).
Finally, qQK |= 〈〈a, b〉〉♦win ∧ E{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉♦win ∧ C{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉♦win
∧¬E{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉♦win∧D{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉♦win: in qQK , the robots have a collective strategy
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to enforce a win, and they all know it (they even have common knowledge about it); on
the other hand, they cannot identify the right strategy as a team – they can only see one
if they share knowledge at the beginning (i.e., in qQK ).
3 Epistemic Temporal Strategic Logic
A very interesting variation on the theme of combining strategic, epistemic and tempo-
ral aspects of a multi-agent system was proposed in [19]. Epistemic Temporal Strategic
Logic (ETSL) digs deeper in the repository of game theory, and focuses on the concept
of undominated strategies. Thus, its variant of cooperation modalities has a different
flavor than the ones from ATL, ATEL, CSL etc. In a way, formula 〈〈A〉〉ϕ in ETSL can be
summarized as:
“If A play rationally to achieve ϕ (meaning: they never play a dominated strategy),
they will achieve ϕ”.
ETSL can be treated as a logic that describes the outcome of rational play under incom-
plete information,3 in the same way as CSL can be seen as a logic that captures agents’
strategic abilities (regardless of whether the agents play rationally or not). The main
claim we propose in this paper is that a rational player knows that he will succeed if,
and only if, he has a strategy “de re” to succeed – while the same is not true for rational
coalitions of players. However, before we present and discuss the claim formally in
Section 4, we must re-write the semantics of ETSL in several respects.
First, the original semantics of ETSL is defined only for finite turn-based acyclic
game models with epistemic accessibility relations, and we will generalize the seman-
tics to concurrent epistemic game structures. Next, the semantics comes with a plethora
of auxiliary functions and definitions (and a couple of omissions), which makes it rather
hard to read. In fact, this is probably the reason why the logic never received the atten-
tion it deserves, and it is definitely worth trying to make the semantics more compact.
Finally, the authors of [19] propose that a model should include also a “grand strategy
profile” SAgt, defining the actual strategies of all agents (or at least constraining them
in some way, since non-deterministic strategies are allowed in ETSL). While the idea
seems interesting in itself (a similar idea was later exploited e.g. in [8] to allow for
explicit analysis of strategies and reasoning about strategy revision), we will show that
it does not introduce a finer-grained analysis of “vanilla” ETSL formulas: if a formula
holds in M, q for one strategy profile, it holds in M, q for all the other strategy profiles,
too. Moreover, it can be proved that the semantics of cooperation modalities 〈〈A〉〉 is the
same regardless of whether we consider non-deterministic strategies or not. In conse-
3 We emphasize that this is a specific notion of rationality (i.e., agents are assumed to play only un-
dominated strategies). Game theory proposes several other rationality criteria as well, based e.g. on Nash
equilibrium, dominant strategies, or Pareto efficiency. In fact, it is easy to imagine ETSL-like logics based on
these notions instead.
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quence, we will be able to show a “vanilla” ETSL semantics expressed entirely in terms
of concurrent epistemic game structures and their states.
3.1 The Semantics Made Easier to Read
Formulae of ETSL come with no restriction with respect to grouping of temporal oper-
ators:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕ | gϕ | ϕ | ϕU ψ | Kaϕ.
After some re-writing (and having it generalized to general game structures, not only
turn-based trees), the semantics can be given as follows. Strategies are allowed to be
non-deterministic, i.e. Sa : St → P(Act).4 We require strategies to be uniform, al-
though [19] does not do it explicitly (we take it as a simple omission, because otherwise
many claims in that paper seem to be false). A collective strategy (strategy profile) SA
is a tuple of strategies, one per agent fromA. S0a is the “neutral strategy” with no restric-
tion on a’s actions (S0a(q) = Act for each q ∈ St), and strategy profile S0A assigns neu-
tral strategies to agents fromA. Moreover, we generalize function out(q, SA) to handle
nondeterministic strategies too; in out′(q, SA), “αi−1a = Sa(qi−1)” is replaced with
αi−1a ∈ Sa(qi−1). Note that, for deterministic SA, we have out′(q, SA) = out(q, SA).
Now, the semantics can be given through the following clauses (the semantics for p, ¬ϕ
and ϕ ∧ ψ is analogous to the one presented in Section 2.1):
M,SAgt, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ iff for all strategies TA, undominated wrt q, ϕ, we have
M, (TA, S
0
Agt\A), q |= ϕ;
M,SAgt, q |= gϕ iff for every Λ ∈ out′(q, SAgt) we have M,SAgt,Λ[1] |= ϕ;
M,SAgt, q |= ϕ iff for every Λ ∈ out′(q, SAgt) and i ≥ 0 we have
M,SAgt,Λ[i] |= ϕ;
M,SAgt, q |= ϕU ψ iff for every Λ ∈ out′(q, SAgt) there is i ≥ 0 such that
M,SAgt,Λ[i] |= ψ and for all j such that 0 ≤ j < i we have
M,SAgt,Λ[j] |= ϕ;
M,SAgt, q |= Kaϕ iff for all q ∼a q′ we have M, (SAgt(a), S0Agt\{a}), q
′ |= ϕ.
Definition 1 Strategy SA dominates TA with respect to formula ϕ, modelM , and state
q, if SA achieves ϕ better then TA, i.e. iff:
1. for every q′ such that q ∼A q′: if M, (TA, S0Agt\A), q′ |= ϕ then also
M, (SA, S
0
Agt\A), q
′ |= ϕ, and
2. there exists q′ such that q ∼A q′, and M, (SA, S0Agt\A), q′ |= ϕ, and
M, (TA, S
0
Agt\A), q 2 ϕ.
4 To preserve seriality (“time flows forever”), we assume that Sa(q) 6= ∅ for all q ∈ St.
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Remark 1 Definition 1 uses epistemic relation ∼A. However, epistemic accessibility
relations are defined only for individual agents in [19], which is perhaps another omis-
sion. In this study, we take the liberty to fix ∼A as ∼EA.
We also point out that ETSL can be extended with collective epistemic operators
EA, CA, DA in a straightforward manner.
Example 3 Consider the gambling robots again. Robot a has two undominated strate-
gies wrt gwin,M, qAK: namely, to play exch in both qAK , qAQ, or to play keep in
both (other choices do not matter). Since playing exch fails in qAK , so: M0, qAK 6|=
〈〈a〉〉 gwin. Furthermore, playing keep is the only undominated strategy in qKQ and
qKA (and it succeeds only in qKQ). Thus, M0, qKQ |= 〈〈a〉〉 gwin, and M0, qKA 6|=
〈〈a〉〉 gwin. Hence, M0, qKQ 6|= Ka〈〈a〉〉 gwin.
3.2 A Few Properties
In this section, we present several properties of ETSL formulae that will allow us to give
an even simpler semantic definition of “vanilla” ETSL.
Proposition 2 For every “vanilla” ETSL formula ϕ, concurrent epistemic game struc-
ture M , and state q in M : M,SAgt, q |= ϕ iff M,S′Agt, q |= ϕ for any pair of “grand”
strategy profiles SAgt, S′Agt.
Proof. By induction on the structure of ϕ. Note that it is sufficient to prove the impli-
cation one way, as the choice of SAgt, S′Agt is completely arbitrary.
Case ϕ ≡ p: M,SAgt, q |= p, so q ∈ pi(q), so M,S′Agt, q |= p.
Case ϕ ≡ ¬ψ: M,SAgt, q |= ¬ψ, so M,SAgt, q 6|= ψ, so (by induction hypothesis)
M,S′
Agt, q 6|= ψ, so M,S
′
Agt, q |= ¬ψ. (As the choice of SAgt, S′Agt was com-
pletely arbitrary, the implication holds the other way too.)
Case ϕ ≡ ψ1 ∧ ψ2: analogous.
Case ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉 gψ: M,SAgt, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 gψ iff M, (TA, S0Agt\A),Λ[1] |= ϕ for all
undominated TA and Λ ∈ out′(q, (TA, S0Agt\A)). Note that the latter condition
does not refer to SAgt, so M,S′Agt, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 gψ too.
Cases ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉ψ and ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉ψ1 U ψ2: analogous.
Case ϕ ≡ Kaψ: M,SAgt, q |= Kaψ, so M, (SAgt(a), S0Agt\{a}), q′ |= ψ for all q ∼a
q′. By induction hypothesis, alsoM, (S′
Agt(a), S
0
Agt\{a}), q
′ |= ψ for all q ∼a q′,
so M,S′
Agt, q |= Kaψ.

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Remark 3 We point out that restricting the scope of Proposition 2 to “vanilla” ETSL
formulae is important. In particular, the epistemic opertor Ka has a non-standard
interpretation when the full language of ETSL is considered.
Proposition 4 Let Φ ≡ gψ,ψ, or ψ1 U ψ2 where ψ, ψ1, ψ2 are “vanilla” ETSL for-
mulae. Moreover, let |Φ| denote the set of paths for which Φ holds; formally, | gψ| =
{Λ |M,Λ[1] |= ψ}, |ψ| = {Λ | ∀iM,Λ[i] |= ψ}, and
|ψ1 U ψ2| = {Λ | ∃i(M,Λ[i] |= ψ2 ∧ ∀0≤j<iM,Λ[j] |= ψ1}.
Then, SA dominates TA wrt Φ,M , and q iff:
1. for every q′, q ∼EA q′: if out(q′, TA) ⊆ |Φ| then also out(q′, SA) ⊆ |Φ|, and
2. there exists q′, q ∼EA q′, such that out(q′, SA) ⊆ |Φ| and out(q′, TA) 6⊆ |Φ|.
Proof. Straightforward from the definition. 
Remark 5 Note that dominance can be characterized in an even more compact way.
Let succq,Φ(SA) = {q ∈ img(q,∼EA) | out(q, SA) ⊆ |Φ|} be the set of states from
img(q,∼EA), for which sa succeeds to enforce Φ. Now, SA dominates TA wrt Φ,M, q
iff succq,Φ(TA)  succq,Φ(SA).
Proposition 6 Let Φ ≡ gψ,ψ, or ψ1 U ψ2 where ψ, ψ1, ψ2 are “vanilla” ETSL
formulae. Strategy TA is dominated wrt Φ,M, q by a strategy SA iff it is dominated wrt
Φ,M, q by a deterministic strategy S′A.
Proof. ⇒: Let TA be dominated by SA (wrt ϕ,M, q). We construct the deterministic
strategy S′A by fixing arbitrary (uniform) choices out of SA. Formally, for every agent
a ∈ A and abstraction class img(q′,∼a) ⊆ St such that Sa(q′) = {α, α′, ...}, we fix
S′a(q
′′) = α for all q′′ ∈ img(q′,∼a). (By uniformity of SA, we have α ∈ Sa(q′′) for
all q′′ ∈ img(q′,∼a), so S′A is a valid strategy.) First, this enforces uniformity of S′A.
Second, out(q¯, S′A) ⊆ out(q¯, SA) for all q¯ ∈ St (by definition of out). Thus, we can
use Proposition 4 to show that S′A dominates TA, which concludes the proof.
⇐: Straightforward. 
Proposition 7 Let Φ be as above. Then, M,SAgt, q |= 〈〈A〉〉Φ iff for all deterministic
strategies TA, undominated wrt Φ, we have M, (TA, S0Agt\A), q |= Φ.
Proof. ⇒: Straightforward.
⇐: Assume that M, (TA, S0Agt\A), q |= Φ for all deterministic strategies TA, undom-
inated wrt Φ, and suppose that there is a nondeterministic undominated SA such that
M, (SA, S
0
Agt\A), q 6|= Φ. Let us fix a deterministic uniform strategy S′A out of SA
in a similar way as in Proposition 6. Now, out(q¯, S′A) ⊆ out(q¯, SA) for all q¯ ∈ St,
so out(q′, SA) ⊆ |Φ| implies out(q′, S′A) ⊆ |Φ| (S′A is never worse than SA wrt Φ).
Moreover, out(q, S′A) ⊆ |Φ| and out(q, SA) 6⊆ |Φ|. By Proposition 4, S′A dominates
SA, so SA is dominated – a contradiction. 
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3.3 ETSL in Terms of Concurrent Epistemic Game Structures
We have shown that, for “vanilla” ETSL, strategies do not have to be referred explicitly
in the interpretation of formulae (Propositions 2 and 4). Moreover, we can restrict
the set of considered strategies to deterministic strategies (Propositions 6 and 7). In
consequence, we can express the semantics of “vanilla” ETSL equivalently in ATL-like
fashion:
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 gϕ iff for every strategy SA, undominated wrt q, gϕ, and everyΛ ∈
out(q, SA), we have that M,Λ[1] |= ϕ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ iff for every strategy SA, undominated wrt q,ϕ, and every Λ ∈
out(q, SA) and i ≥ 0 we have M,Λ[i] |= ϕ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ iff for every strategy SA, undominated wrt q, ϕU ψ, and every
Λ ∈ out(q, SA), there is i ≥ 0 such that M,Λ[i] |= ψ and for all
j such that 0 ≤ j < i we have M,Λ[j] |= ϕ.
Only uniform deterministic strategies are taken into account. The semantics of p,
¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ, and the epistemic operators is the same as for ATL and ATEL.
4 Playing Rationally vs. Knowing how to Play
We can finally present the main result of this paper, namely, that a rational player knows
that he will succeed if, and only if, he has a strategy “de re” to succeed. The result holds
under the assumption that the model is finite,5 or more generally, that it includes at least
one undominated strategy.
Moreover, we show that having common knowledge how to succeed is, in general, a
stronger property than knowing that one will succeed for rational coalitions of players.
That is, if rational agents have common knowledge about a winning strategy, then they
have common knowledge that they will succeed – but the converse is not true any more.
Surprisingly enough, it turns out that the relationship is strictly reverse for distributed
knowledge: if a rational coalition has distributed knowledge that it will succeed, then it
has distributed knowledge about a winning strategy – but not necessarily the other way
around. For mutual knowledge, the relationship holds neither way.
In what follows, we use |=ETSL and |=CSL to denote the ETSL and CSL satisfaction
relation, respectively.
4.1 Rational Play of Individual Agents
We begin with two important lemmas.
5 We use the term “finite model” to denote a CEGS with a finite set of states St.
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Lemma 8 Given a finite model M , state q in M , formula Φ and agent a, there is a
strategy sa which is undominated wrt M, q,Φ.
Proof. First, we consider the simpler case when the set of actions Act is finite. In such
a case, the set of strategies is also finite, and the dominance relation is transitive and
antireflexive. Suppose that every strategy is dominated; then, there must be a strategy
which is dominated by itself – a contradiction.
We sketch the proof for infiniteAct as follows. We partition the infinite set of strate-
gies into equivalence classes, such that strategies in the same class have the same out-
come paths for every state q (i.e., sa ≈ ta iff ∀qout(q, sa) = out(q, ta)). Obviously, if
sa dominates ta, then all strategies s′a ≈ sa dominate ta too. Now, at every state q (and
therefore at every point on a path from out(q′, sa)) there is a finite number of possible
sets of successor states (the actual set being determined by the choice sa(q)). Moreover,
the same choice (and hence a set of successors) must be taken at every further occur-
rence of the same state q on a path, since sa is a memoryless strategy. In consequence,
there is only a finite number of different sets of outcome paths, and hence a finite num-
ber of the equivalence classes. Again, dominance is transitive and antireflexive, so an
undominated strategy must exist. 
Remark 9 Note that the result in Lemma 8 does not extend to CEGS with infinite state
spaces. Consider the game of “Fuzzy Blackjack” (called so all the more because our
robots play it usually after having consumed too much machine oil). Only a single
player is necessary, and we use positive real numbers as states and actions (i.e., St =
Act = R+). When the player chooses a number in state q, the number is added to the
state: o(q, α) = q + α. The values below 1 are the winning ones, i.e. pi(win) = (0, 1)
(it should be 21, but this would make the game too complicated for a drunken robot).
Moreover, the robot cannot distinguish between the states below 1: q ∼a q′ for all
q, q′ ∈ (0, 1). Now, there is no undominated strategy wrt 0.5, gwin.
To prove this, suppose that a strategy sa is undominated. The strategy is uniform,
so sa(q) = α for some α ∈ R+ and all q ∈ (0, 1). Obviously, α ∈ (0, 1), be-
cause else sa never succeeds. Now, the set of states in which sa is successful is:
succ
0.5, gwin(sa) = (0, 1 − α). Let ta(q) = q + α/2. Now, succ0.5, gwin(ta) =
(0, 1− α/2) ! succ0.5,Φ(sa) – a contradiction. Note also that:
• If we replace R+ with the set of positive rational numbers, the result is the same.
So, there may be no undominated strategies even when we restrict St and Act to
countable sets.
• In order to show the same for countableSt and finiteAct, it is sufficient to modify
the example so thatAct = {0, 1, call}, and the initial state and every subsequent
action α = 0, 1 are simply stored in the resulting state. Now o(q, call) takes
the initial state q0 and the string of 0s and 1s α1, ..., αn stored in q, and returns
q′ = q0 + (0.α1...αn1)2. For such a game, there is no undominated strategy wrt
0.5,♦win.
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Lemma 10 Given M, q,Φ, a, if there is an undominated strategy wrt M, q,Φ, then
there is also an undominated strategy wrt M, q′,Φ for every q′ ∈ img(q,∼a).
Proof. Take any sa undominated wrt M, q,Φ (*). Suppose now that sa is dominated
by some strategy ta wrt another state q′ ∈ img(q,∼a) (**).
1. By (*) and Prop. 4: ∀q′′∈img(q,∼a) (out(q′′, ta) ⊆ |Φ| ⇒ out(q′′, sa) ⊆ |Φ|).
2. By (**) and Prop. 4: ∃q′′∈img(q′,∼a) (out(q′′, ta) ⊆ |Φ| ∧ out(q′′, sa) 6⊆ |Φ|).
Moreover, img(q,∼a) = img(q′,∼a) because is ∼a is an equivalence relation – which
gives a contradiction between (1) and (2). 
Remark 11 We note that Lemma 10 may hold even for indistinguishability relations
that are not equivalences. In fact, it is sufficient to require that ∼a is transitive. In that
case, q′ ∈ img(q,∼a) and q′′ ∈ img(q′,∼a) implies that q′′ ∈ img(q,∼a), and we
also get the contradiction.
We are ready to prove the main claim of this paper now.
Theorem 12 Let us consider only finite models, and formulae Φ ≡ gψ,ψ, or
ψ1 U ψ2 where ψ, ψ1, ψ2 are “vanilla” ETSL formulae. An agent has a strategy “de
re” to enforce Φ if, and only if, he knows that his rational play will bring about Φ.
Formally, for every finite M and state q in M :
M, q |=ETSL Ka〈〈a〉〉Φ iff M, q |=CSL Ka〈〈a〉〉Φ.
Proof. Induction on the structure of Φ. We prove the theorem for the case Φ ≡ ψ.
Other cases are analogous.
⇒: Let M, q |=ETSL Ka〈〈a〉〉ψ. Then, ∀q′∈img(q,∼a)M, q
′ |=ETSL 〈〈a〉〉ψ, and
hence M, q |=ETSL 〈〈a〉〉ψ in particular. By Lemmas 8 and 10, there is a strategy sa,
undominated wrt M, q′,ψ for every q′ ∈ img(q,∼a).
Then: ∀q′∈img(q,∼a)∀Λ∈out(q′,sa)∀iM,Λ[i] |=ETSL ψ. By the induction hypothesis,
also ∀q′∈img(q,∼a)∀Λ∈out(q′,sa)∀iM,Λ[i] |=CSL ψ. Thus, ∀Λ∈out(img(q,∼a),sa)∀i
M,Λ[i] |=CSL ψ and soM, img(q,∼a) |=CSL 〈〈a〉〉ψ, and finallyM, q |=CSL Ka〈〈a〉〉ψ.
⇐: Let M, q |=CSL Ka〈〈a〉〉ψ, i.e. M, img(q,∼a) |=CSL 〈〈a〉〉ψ. Consider q
′ ∈
img(q,∼a). By transitivity of ∼a, we have img(q′,∼a) ⊆ img(q,∼a), so also
∀q′∈img(q,∼a)M, img(q
′,∼a) |=CSL 〈〈a〉〉ψ. Then, for every q
′ ∈ img(q,∼a), there
must be sa such that ∀q′′∈img(q′,∼a)∀Λ∈out(q′′,sa)∀iM,Λ[i] |=CSL ψ, and hence (by in-
duction)∀q′′∈img(q′,∼a)∀Λ∈out(q′′,sa)∀iM,Λ[i] |=ETSL ψ. So, succq′,ψ(sa) = img(q′,∼a),
and therefore succq′,ψ(ta) = img(q′,∼a) for every other undominated strategy ta
(otherwise ta would be dominated by sa). Thus, M, q′ |=ETSL 〈〈a〉〉ψ for every
q′ ∈ img(q,∼a), and finally M, q |=ETSL Ka〈〈a〉〉ψ. 
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Theorem 13 More generally, for every Φ as above, and M, q such that there exists an
undominated strategy wrt M, q,Φ: M, q |=ETSL Ka〈〈a〉〉Φ iff M, q |=CSL Ka〈〈a〉〉Φ.
It is easy to see that Theorem 13 implies Theorem 12.
4.2 Rational Coalitions Are at Disadvantage
Beside some philosophical insight into the nature of knowledge and rational play, The-
orems 12 and 13 provide us with an alternative way of decomposing strategic abilities
under incomplete information into a strategic and epistemic part. The definition of the
strategic dimension is more sophisticated and less straightforward than usually; on the
other hand, we do not pay the price of a non-standard satisfaction relation. Unfortu-
nately, such decomposition is not valid any more when abilities of collective agents
are concerned. Now, the relationship is much more limited: if a coalition has common
knowledge how to play, then it has also common knowledge that rational play will be
successful; the same does not hold for other types of collective knowledge. Moreover,
the converse relationship is guaranteed for distributed knowledge, but not for common
nor mutual knowledge.
Theorem 14 Let Φ ≡ gψ,ψ, or ψ1 U ψ2 where ψ, ψ1, ψ2 are “vanilla” ETSL for-
mulae. Then, if a coalition has common knowledge how to play, then it has common
knowledge that rational play will be successful:
if M, q |=CSL CA〈〈A〉〉Φ then M, q |=ETSL CA〈〈A〉〉Φ.
The same holds for neither mutual nor distributed knowledge.
Proof. Common knowledge: Let M, q |=CSL KA〈〈A〉〉ψ, i.e. M, img(q,∼CA)
|=CSL 〈〈A〉〉ψ. Consider q
′ ∈ img(q,∼CA). We have img(q′,∼EA) ⊆ img(q′,∼CA) ⊆
img(q,∼CA), so also ∀q′∈img(q,∼C
A
)M, img(q
′,∼EA) |=CSL 〈〈A〉〉ψ. Then, for every
q′ ∈ img(q,∼CA), there must be SA such that ∀q′′∈img(q′,∼E
A
)∀Λ∈out(q′′,SA)∀iM,Λ[i]
|=CSL ψ, and hence (by induction) ∀q′′∈img(q′,∼EA)∀Λ∈out(q′′,SA)∀iM,Λ[i] |=ETSL ψ.
So, succq′,ψ(SA) = img(q′,∼EA), and therefore succq′,ψ(TA) = img(q′,∼EA) for
every other undominated strategy TA (otherwise TA would be dominated by SA). Thus,
M, q′ |=ETSL 〈〈A〉〉ψ for every q
′ ∈ img(q,∼CA), and finallyM, q |=ETSL CA〈〈A〉〉ψ.
Mutual knowledge: for a counterexample, consider a modification of the game from
Figure 1, in which a third robot c is introduced. The robot can only execute nop,
and its epistemic relation ∼c= {(q, q) | q ∈ St} ∪ {(qKQ, qKA), (qKA, qKQ)}, i.e.
c can distinguish all states except qKQ, qKA. Moreover, the transition function is
slightly changed: now, o(qKA, keep, nop) = qw. For the resulting system M1, we
have that M1, qAQ |=CSL E{b,c}〈〈b, c〉〉 gwin, but at the same time M1, qAQ 6|=ETSL
E{a,c}〈〈a, c〉〉 gwin because M1, qKQ 6|=ETSL 〈〈a, c〉〉 gwin.
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q1 q2
qw
ql
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q4 q3
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q0 q1a ab q2 q3
qw ql
1,1
1,1
2,2
2,2
1,1
2,2
win
(B)
Figure 2: (A) Model M2: four agents a, b, c, d, epistemic relations shown with the
dashed lines, Act = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Transitions: o(qi, j, j, j, j) = qw for j 6= i, otherwise
the system proceeds to the “losing” state ql; (B) Model M3: two agents a, b, two
actions 1, 2. The tuples of actions that are absent in the graph lead to ql.
Distributed knowledge: analogously, M1, qKQ |=CSL D{b,c}〈〈b, c〉〉 gwin, yet at the
same timeM1, qKQ 6|=ETSL D{a,c}〈〈a, c〉〉 gwin becauseM1, qKQ 6|=ETSL 〈〈a, c〉〉 gwin.

Theorem 15 Let Φ ≡ gψ,ψ, or ψ1 U ψ2 where ψ, ψ1, ψ2 are “vanilla” ETSL for-
mulae, and let M be a finite CEGS.6 Then, if A have distributed knowledge that ratio-
nal play will bring about Φ, then they have distributed knowledge how to play to bring
about Φ. Formally:
if M, q |=ETSL DA〈〈A〉〉Φ then M, q |=CSL DA〈〈A〉〉Φ.
The same holds for neither mutual nor common knowledge.
Proof. (sketch) Distributed knowledge: the proof is analogous to the proofs of
Lemma 10 and Theorem 12 (part ⇒), as we can exploit the fact that ∼DA is transitive,
and img(q,∼DA ) ⊆ img(q,∼EA).
Mutual knowledge: for a counterexample, consider model M2 from Figure 2A. Let
q denote the state “opposite” to q, i.e. q1 = q3, q2 = q4 etc. Furthermore, let SiAgt
denote the strategy of playing 〈i, i, i, i〉 in all states. Now, Si
Agt is the only undomi-
nated strategy wrt qi, gwin for i = 1, ..., 4, and S1Agt, ..., S4Agt are exactly the strategies
undominated wrt q0, gwin. So, M2, qi |=ETSL 〈〈Agt〉〉 gwin for every i = 0, 1, ..., 4,
and therefore M2, q0 |=ETSL EAgt〈〈Agt〉〉 gwin. On the other hand, there is no single
strategy that succeeds for all q0, q1, ..., q4.
Common knowledge: consider model M3 from Figure 2B. Let S{a,b} be the strategy
“play 〈1, 1〉 everywhere”, and T{a,b} be “play 〈2, 2〉 everywhere”. Note that S{a,b}
is the only undominated strategy wrt q, gwin for q = q0, q1, and T{a,b} is the only
6 Alternatively, we can request that A have at least one undominated strategy for every relevant state.
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undominated strategy wrt q, gwin for q = q2, q3. Thus, for every q = q0, ..., q3:
M3, q |=ETSL 〈〈a, b〉〉
gwin, and hence M3, q1 |=ETSL C{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉 gwin. On the other
hand, M3, q1 6|=CSL C{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉 gwin. 
5 Conclusions
In this paper, the relationship between rational play and knowing how to play is inves-
tigated in a formal way. To this end, we dust off Epistemic Temporal Strategic Logic
by van Otterloo and Jonker [19], and propose a simpler semantics expressed entirely in
terms of concurrent epistemic game structures and their states; we prove that the new
semantics is equivalent to the original one for “vanilla” ETSL formulae. ETSL serves
as a device for talking about the outcome of rational play (in the sense that agents
are assumed to play only undominated strategies). To capture properties of the other
kind (“knowing how to play”), we use the recent proposal of Constructive Strategic
Logic [9, 10].
The main result of this paper states that, for finite models, a rational player knows
that he will succeed if, and only if, he knows how to succeed. We also show that the
relationship is much more limited for rational coalitions. That is, if rational agents have
common knowledge about a winning strategy, then they have common knowledge that
they will succeed – but the converse is not guaranteed any more. Moreover, it turns out
that the relationship is strictly reverse for distributed knowledge: if a rational coalition
has distributed knowledge that it will succeed, then it has distributed knowledge about
a winning strategy – but not necessarily the other way around. Finally, for mutual
knowledge, the relationship does not hold either way in general. This is a curious
result, and one that may lead to interesting philosophical conclusions.
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